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E. Kurmay Yarbay Mustafa Kemal Öztürk

http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/emeklibirsubay

31 Aralık '10

 
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Suriye Laik Cumhuriyeti Islami Cumhuriyet mi Oluyor?

Suriye Laik Cumhuriyeti Islami Cumhuriyet mi Oluyor?
 

Suriye Cumhurbaskani ve Esi


Fotografda esi ile birlikte gordugunuz Suriye Cumhurbaskani, babasindan teslim aldigi "Laik Cumhuriyeti" degistiriyor mu? Bu sorunun cevabini ben arastirmadim. Daha dogrusu, Suriye'de neler olup bittiginin farkinda bile degildim. Wikileaks 'in yayinladigi belgelere bakarken ABD Suriye Elciliginin gonderdigi mesaj dikkatimi cekti. Amerikalilar, Suriye'de olan biteni gozlemlemisler.

***

Suriye Hukumeti; Halep Universitesi' nde "Seriat Kanunu Fakultesi" nin acilmasina karar vermis. Bununla kalmamis; 3 Islam bankasinin faaliyet gostermesine izin vermis. Dahasi; bir din adaminin "Suriye Kurmay Koleji" diyebilecegimiz okulunda konusmaci olarak gorevlendirmis...

Amerikalilara gore bunlar, bu yapilanlar, Sunni topluma hukumetin vermek istedigi sicak mesajlar...

Bu arada da ayni hukumet; dini faaliyetlere bazi kisitlamalar da getirmek istemis!

- Camilerin calisma saatleri belirlenmis.

- Camilerde izinsiz bagis toplanmasi yasaklanmis.

- Camilerde izinsiz kisilerin vaaz vermemesi icin tedbirler alinmis.

- Hoperlorlerin seslerinin kisilmasi icin emir verilmis..

Yine Amerikalilara gore; bu tedbirlerden daha sonra vaz gecilmis!

***

Mesajda "Yorum" da var.

Simdiye kadar "Laik" gorunum izleyen Suriye Hukumeti'nin atesle oynadigini belirtmisler.

***

Bu Wikileaks 'in yayinladigi belgeler iyi oldu.

Amerikali Dilomatlarin uzerinde uzunca calistigi, kafa yordugu, kendi hukumet yetkililerine gonderdigi bilgiler, bizim gibi siradan insanlarin bilgisayarlarina kadar geliverdi.

Sozunu ettigim mesaji bulamayanlar icin kopyasini asagi da sunuyorum:

SUBJECT: SARG CONTINUES TO PLAY WITH ISLAMIC FIRE REF: A. DAMASCUS 1157 B. DAMASCUS 0531 C. 05 DAMASCUS 1231 D. 05 DAMASCUS 1377 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 1. (C) Summary: The SARG continues to play with the issue of Islam in the wake of its February use of mob violence against several European embassies in ways designed to shore up support for the regime. In the past month there have been numerous reports about regime outreach to the Islamic community, including presidential approval of a Sharia law faculty at Aleppo University, the licensing of three Islamic banks, and allowing for the first time a prominent Islamic figure to lecture at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus. While there were also SARG efforts during this period that pointed towards stepped-up measures to counter rising Islamist influence, including restrictions on activities permitted at mosques (announced and then quickly walked back) , the basic thrust of the policy was to manipulate Islamic elements to shore up the regime, as well as prevent former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood leader Sadreddine Bayanouni from developing any traction in the Sunni community. Although some contacts believe the regime is playing with fire, they assess that it sees itself under threat and is willing to take serious risks. While alarmist scenarios about the rising tide of Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the time being to be successfully manipulating this Islam issue. End Summary. 2. (C) After an initial appeal to Syrian nationalism in the period between the release of the two Mehlis reports, the SARG gradually shifted to Islamic themes to mobilize support for the regime and counter the pressure created by the UNIIIC investigation. The SARG's February decision to manipulate the Danish cartoons controversy by permitting large demonstrations in front of European embassies led to rioting crowds that heavily damaged four embassies. That result offered Syria the opportunity to portray itself, internally and regionally, as the leading defender of Islam's dignity. 3. (C) RECENT SARG ISLAMIC OUTREACH: In the past month there has been a spate of reports about regime activity that seems designed to follow up in a quieter manner on this effort. Asad in mid-April signed a decree permitting the establishment of a Sharia (Islamic law) faculty at Aleppo University, a step the SARG reportedly avoided in the past over fears about powerful (Sunni) Islamist influence in Aleppo. The government also announced a decision, the first of its kind, to license three private Islamic banks (ref A). 4. (C) Also in early April, in an unprecedented move, the regime allowed a sheikh, moderate Islamist MP Mohammed Habash, to address the officers at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus, with the attendance of the Minister of Defense, as well as the Grand Mufti and other religious figures. In Habash's widely publicized remarks, he stated that (secular) Arab nationalism and Islam are consistent and should be used to form a common front to face the challenges of defending the country and the Arab homeland. He also called for a new political parties law that would permit the formation of Islamic parties. In the run-up to the mid-April celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the SARG and its proxies re-decorated the city of Damascus with a new set of official-looking banners accentuating religious themes, the first time in recent memory that such an organized display has taken place on this holiday. According to contacts, SARG officials pressured businessman and shopkeepers to put up the banners, which were also displayed at mosques and government buildings. (Note: Two weeks later, the banners remain prominently on display in the city's central market.) 5. (C) ALSO SOME SARG REPRESSION: It should be noted that there were also SARG efforts during this period that pointed, at least to some degree, in the opposite direction, towards stepped-up SARG efforts to counter rising Islamist influence. In March, for example, the head of the Damascus section of the Ministry of the Islamic Endowments (Awqaaf) issued a list of ten restrictions on activities at mosques, limiting the hours of operation to times of prayer, preventing any unauthorized speakers or activities, including the collection of donations, and requiring the lowering of the volume of loudspeakers used in the calls to prayer at dawn and in the afternoon. Most of this list was reportedly cobbled together DAMASCUS 00001848 002 OF 003 from previous restrictions the SARG had issued over the years, through the Awqaaf Ministry, that had not been uniformly enforced. 6. (C) ISLAMIC LEADERS PROTEST: In reaction to this measure, the regime-tolerant Sunni Islamic establishment protested angrily to their friends inside the regime including senior officials in the security services at what they viewed as an unnecessary, clumsy effort to rein them in. Sheikh Salah Kuftaro, head of the influential Abu Noor Institute, told Polchief that he had protested against the newly issued restrictions, which he dubbed the "Ten Commandments," to the Damascus chief of Syrian Military Intelligence after the Minister of the Awqaaf indicated reluctance to rescind the directive. Kuftaro told Polchief he had received a commitment from his contacts in the intelligence services that the directive "had been frozen," but not rescinded. (Comment: Some conspiratorial-minded observers insist the regime deliberately had the Awqaaf put out the list of restrictions so that it could then show its good will towards the Islamic community by agreeing to disregard its own rules. The evidence, however, points to the somewhat messier process detailed above.) 7. (C) A COMPLICATED DYNAMIC: This push-pull dynamic, with the regime encouraging "moderate" Islamists on the one hand, while repressing what it perceives to be a threatening Islamist minority (and threatening Islamic aspects in general) on the other, is not new (refs B, C, and D). The Asad regime has practiced some version of it since the early 1980's after it violently suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood as a way to woo back the Sunni community, while preventing the development of any Islamist political competition. This dynamic has always been reflected in a messy process on the ground, with sometimes overzealous SARG officials repressing too much or in the wrong places, followed by push-back from the Islamic establishment, and an adjustment by the regime. According to astute regime observer Ayman Abdul Noor, a Ba'athist reformer, this has occurred at key junctures like the present moment, when senior regime figures "who are in the picture," know and understand the policy of manipulating and using the Islamists to shore up the regime, while the mass of lower-level officials continue with enforcing the standard policy of "reining in the Islamic crowd." 8. (C) REGIME PLAYING WITH FIRE: Overall, despite some contradictions, it seems evident that the regime is reaching out once again to the Sunni Islamic community with various initiatives and adopting some elements of an Islamic populism to shore up support. According to gadfly economist and former deputy minister of planning Riad Abrash, the regime has calculated now that Arab nationalist interests "are identical" with the Islamic population's desire, both in Syria and the region, to oppose the U.S. In his view, the regime "is getting closer to the view of people on the street" in order to retain its popularity. The regime recognizes the powerful hold that Islam has on the masses, said Abrash. He acknowledged that the regime "is playing with fire," but noted "they want to survive. They feel threatened, so it makes sense to take dangerous steps." 9. (C) ONLY WEAK FELLOW PLAYERS ALLOWED: Despite the willingness to take risks with Islam now, the regime wants to ensure that it controls the game and manipulates all the players, for its own interests. For that reason, the Asad regime is not willing to make any deal with the Muslim Brothers even if it might bring more Sunni support for the regime. "They want to play with the religious issue themselves. They don't want to cede it to potential competitors," explained Abrash. 10. (C) REGIME MOTIVATIONS: Other observers agree that international pressure on the regime over the past year has put it on the defensive. According to dissident Yassin Haj Saleh, the regime is "relatively relaxed" in the short term (prior to the June release of Brammertz's second report), but in the longer term, "sees itself in a life-threatening struggle with the U.S.," which makes it willing to ally itself closely with Iran, for example, and to curry favor with Islamists in Syria. The regime has made sure to champion the Palestinian cause (through its support of Hamas), as well as that of Hizballah, and has been sufficiently supportive of the insurgency in Iraq over the past few years, all to ensure, according to Abdul Noor, that DAMASCUS 00001848 003 OF 003 Islamists "have no political case to take to the street and attack the regime." The SARG also seems motivated by the desire to prevent former VP Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood leader Bayanouni, with their National Salvation Front, from developing any traction in the Sunni community. Finally, unidentified Ba'ath Party officials, echoing Habash's moderate Islamist view, have noted in the press recently that there is room for dialogue between secular Ba'athists and moderate Islamists, while such dialogue with Islamic radicals is impossible. 11. (C) WEAKNESSES OF THE APPROACH: Saleh and others identify several weaknesses in the SARG approach. According to Saleh, Syria needs a moderate Islamic political party, which would force the Islamists to deal responsibly with political issues. "It can't be avoided, but the regime wants to jump over this step." The regime prefers an Islamic establishment dependent on it for favors and subservient to its politics, rather than "a free-thinking, independent group." Consequently the SARG is willing to accept its policies in fact actually end up encouraging close-minded, very conservative Islamic institutions, as long as they are subservient to the regime. This phenomenon, however, causes some Islamic elements to become more radical and extreme in the longer term, as a way to attack the co-optation, insisted Saleh. 12. (C) In addition, the overall "street power" of Islam is increasing by the day in Syria, according to Damascus-based al-Hayat correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi. In his view, the regime's tactics already betray a nervousness and defensiveness in the way it addresses Islamic issues. According to Hamidi, the rising tide of Islamism in Syria is likely eventually to overwhelm the regime and its secular orientation. As an example of the rising tide of Islamic religious fervor which the regime is nervously observing and trying to control, he pointed to relatively new women's Islamic movement in Syria, the Qubasyat, with thousands of adherents (see septel). 13. (C) COMMENT: While alarmist scenarios about the future rising tide of Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the time being to be successfully manipulating this Islam issue, occasionally blending in some populist aspects. The regime is well-positioned politically because of its championing of Islamic political causes such as those of Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran, and has adopted a sufficiently nuanced policy on Iraq to immunize it against criticism that it is helping suppress an Islamic insurgency. Nevertheless, some Sunni leaders tell us that the regime's attempts to manipulate the Islam issue are not credible and that people are not taken in by it. Where the SARG has been effective is in keeping Islamic leaders in Syria under its wing, supported and politically muzzled. The more populist touches seem designed to drown out the unwelcome noise coming from the Brammertz investigation and in tandem with appeals to Syrian nationalism to persuade Syrians that it is not the regime (and Asad family) under attack but the country and the Islamic nation.

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İmkanınız olursa ülkemizdeki cumhuriyet ilanının altında yatanları da çok farklı kaynaklardan araştırabilirsiniz. Özellikle de; Kazım Karabekir Paşa'nın yayınlanan günlüklerindeki "bana İngiliz komiser Cumhuriyeti ilan etmemizi önerdi…" ifadesini. Ve başlıkta sorulan, (bir ordunun ) Aç ve susuzluğu yönetilebilir mi? Eğer, komutan uzun süre aç ve susuz kalmışsa elbette çok başarılı olarak yönetebilir. Değilse, en başta kendisini, sonra da ordusunu başarısız kılar. Bununla ne demek istedik? Onu da izninizle sizin kurmaylıktan öğrendiklerinize bırakalım. Size ve ailenize sağlıklı ve huzurlu nice uzun yıllar diliyorum. Sağlıcakla kalınız.

Canmehmet 
 31.12.2010 9:57
Cevap :
Sagolun emek verip yazdiginiz icin. Saygilar.  03.01.2011 20:52
 

Etmektedir. Fransız ihtilali ile Wilson ilkelerini bölünmeler için ölçü alabilirsiniz. İlginç olan Fransız ihtilalinin, ilkeleri ile çelişmesidir. Ve bu daima gözden kaçırılmıştır. Osmanlı sözde yönettikleri küçük devletlere özgürlük verilmesi için parçalanmış, gerçeğinde bu devletler sonradan, Rusya, ABD ve AB tarafından (siyasi ve fiziki) işgal edilerek acımasızca sömürülmüş, sömürülmeye de devam etmektedirler. Konuya gelirsek, Laiklik İslam için bir anlam ifade etmemektedir. Çünkü İslam özünde Laiklik anlayışı ile bağdaşmaz. Bu nedenle ülkemizdeki laiklik anlayışı, devlet ve dinin kendi yerlerine çekilmesi değil, dinin (çok açık olarak) ortadan kaldırılmasıdır. Ki, Türkiye’de Dinin İslam’la bir ilgisi kalmamıştır. İlginçtir, batılı ülkeler, Çoğumuzdan daha fazla olarak Türkiye’de (uydurma) laik anlayışın devamını istemektedir. Özetle; Batı, bölgemizde Ne İslam’ı, ne de İslam ülkelerinin birleşmesini istemektedir.

Canmehmet 
 31.12.2010 9:52
 

Değerli Mustafa Kemal Bey, Siyasi ve askeri meselelere, bir Amerikalı veya bir Avrupalı gözüyle baktığımızda, meselelerin kişisel beklenti ve kültürel değerleriyle analiz edildiğini biliriz. Diplomatların yaptığı, bir durum tespitinin yanında, kaydettiklerinde, gelecek ve geçmiş beklentileri de bulunmaktadır. Ortadoğu, Balkanlar, Afrika ve Yakın Asya, günümüzde büyük devletlerin, büyüklüklerinin devamı için gerekli olan hammadde ve stratejik değerlere sahiptir. Bu nedenle "Ayının kırk türküsü vardır. Kırkı da armut üzerinedir." İfadesinde olduğu sömürgecilerin kırk türküsü; sömürülecek malzeme ve devletler üzerinedir. Bu bölgede onlar için gelecekte tehlike olabilecekler, bölge ülkelerinin birleşerek bir sinerji oluşturarak, nükleer teknoloji (silahlara) sahip olmalarıdır. Elbette burada akla ilk gelen İslam ülkeleridir. Batı, bunu bildiği için mümkün olduğu ölçüde İslam ülkelerini; mezhep, kabile, ırk, milliyetçilik ve benzeri nedenlerle bölebildiği kadar bölmüş ve bölmeye devam

Canmehmet 
 31.12.2010 9:52
 
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Harp Okulu 1974 mezunuyum. 1983'de Kurmay Subay olarak mezun oldum. 1987 yılında Silahlı Kuvv..

 
 
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